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Employee representation and consultative voice in multinational 
companies operating in Britain  
 
ABSTRACT 
MNCs from different countries of origin are widely held to have distinct preferences regarding 
the presence of employee representative structures and the form that employee ‘voice’ over 
management decisions takes. Such preferences are said to derive from the national models which 
prevail in the different countries of origin in which MNCs are based. Findings from a large-scale 
survey of the UK operations of MNCs indicate that country-of-origin influences on patterns of 
employee representation and emphasis on direct or indirect channels of employee ‘voice’ are 
attenuated by other factors, notably sector and method of growth. They also reveal significant 
recent innovation in representation and voice arrangements by this key group of employers.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Multinational companies (MNCs) from different countries of origin are widely held to have 
differing preferences over arrangements for employee voice: union representation, non-union 
representation or none at all; indirect or direct forms of consultative voice. Studies have 
established the distinctiveness of voice arrangements in their British operations of MNCs 
headquartered in the US (e.g. Ferner et al, 2005), Japan (e.g. Wilkinson et al, 1993) and 
Germany (e.g. Tüselmann et al, 2005) as compared with domestic practice. Yet none has 
examined the practice of MNCs based in a range of major countries within a single host 
environment. The paper draws on original UK survey data to do so.  
Britain offers a pertinent environment to examine the ‘home country’ influences which shape 
MNC preferences. It is a large, internationally open economy characterised by substantial flows 
of inwards and outwards foreign direct investment (FDI) over a sustained period, resulting in 
stocks which account for 10 per cent of the global total (UN, 2007). These flows have 
accelerated markedly in recent years, reflecting an upsurge in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (Edwards and Walsh, 2008), and the proportion of the UK’s manufacturing 
workforce employed by overseas-owned MNCs has jumped from 19 per cent in 2000 to 27 in 
2005 (OECD, 2007). As a major ‘liberal market’ economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001), Britain’s 
institutional arrangements are relatively permissive of variation in industrial relations practice, 
including employee voice arrangements. Given the political-economic context prevailing since 
the mid-1980s, (multinational) employers may have become less constrained than hitherto in 
implementing their preferences. Reviewing developments in the main Anglophone countries 
including Britain, Purcell and Georgiadis (2007: 182) conclude that ‘[t]he future of employee 
voice is largely in the hands of employers’. Furthermore, the UK is emblematic of the two main 
current trends in employee voice arrangements characterising these economies: a widespread 
decline in union presence within firms, and the rise of direct forms of employee involvement.  
The paper reports and analyses findings of a large-scale survey of employment practice, based on 
interviews with senior HR executives, in three hundred MNCs with operations in Britain. It 
investigates variation between MNCs headquartered in different parts of Europe, as well as those 
based in Japan and the US. Two issues are addressed: patterns of representation, distinguishing 
between union and non-union structures, and recent changes therein; and the presence of indirect 
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and direct forms of consultative voice and, where both exist, the relative emphasis accorded to 
them. Section 2 establishes key conceptual distinctions in operationalising employee voice, 
summarises recent developments in Britain, reviews existing studies of the impact of MNCs 
from different countries of origin on practice and develops two main propositions. The survey of 
MNCs’ employment practice and the data the paper draws on are introduced in section 3. Section 
4 reports findings and the results of logistic regression analysis. The country-of-origin influences 
anticipated are not all confirmed, and significant intra-model variation, arising from the effects 
of sector and method of corporate growth, is identified. Section 5 discusses the implications and 
concludes.  
 
2. Employee voice: bringing in the multinational factor  
Employee representation and consultative voice 
Employee voice entails the presence of institutions or processes which facilitate two-way 
communication between management and employees. Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) application 
to relations between firms and their workers of Hirschman’s (1971) exit-voice theory of 
consumer behaviour  focused solely on union representation in institutionalising employee voice. 
More recent work recognises the diversity that voice arrangements take, including non-union as 
well as union representation and direct as well as indirect (representative-based) forms of 
employee participation (Bryson, 2004; Freeman et al., 2007). Accordingly, 
We understand employee voice as incorporating representative voice and various forms 
of participation developed directly between management and workers. (Freeman et al., 
2007: 3).  
Although the precise operationalisation of employee voice varies in the extensive recent 
literature on practice in Britain (Brewster et al, 2007; Bryson, 2004; Bryson and Freeman, 2007; 
Millward et al, 2000; Willman et al, 2006) two key distinctions are apparent. The first concerns 
the existence of employee representation arrangements, and where present the distinction 
between those organisations which recognise trade unions and those with non-union structures of 
representation. The second addresses the nature of consultative voice. Indirect consultative voice 
occurs through representative arrangements, including union structures, joint consultative 
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committees (which can be union and/or non-union based) or non-union structures such as 
company councils. Direct channels of consultative voice are constituted by two-way mechanisms 
of employee communication and involvement, such as team briefing, quality circles and ‘town 
hall’ meetings between managers and the workforce (Bryson, 2004; Freeman et al., 2007; 
Millward et al., 2000).  
Recent studies have mapped significant change on both dimensions across the advanced 
Anglophone economies. Purcell and Georgiadis (2007) identify two common trends: a 
widespread decline in union membership and representation; and a marked growth in employers’ 
use of direct forms of employee involvement. In Britain, findings from the 2004 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) reveal that alongside a further decline in union 
representation since the 1998 WERS has come a ‘growing heterogeneity of representational 
forms within British workplaces’ (Charlwood and Terry, 2007: 335). This includes non-union 
structures and hybrid arrangements combining union and non-union representation. WERS2004 
also found a shift in the mix of channels through which consultative voice is exercised, with a 
decline in the proportion of workplaces covered by a joint consultative committee and an 
increase in the already high proportion of workplaces utilising one or more two-way forms of 
direct, employee involvement (Kersley et al, 2005). The decline in indirect forms of consultation 
is all the more striking given the prospective implementation of the UK’s Information and 
Consultation of Employees (ICE) legislation, which came into effect in April 2005.  
These marked changes draw attention to the role of employer preferences in shaping 
arrangements for employee voice, to which the literature has given ‘insufficient attention’ 
(Bryson et al., 2006: 280). Employers have ‘decided preferences’ on the presence and form of 
voice regime, continue Bryson et al. (2006), and scope to act on these in a country such as 
Britain with (until recently) little legal prescription. Even under the ICE legislation, the initiative 
as to whether to respond and the choice over the form of any consultative arrangement 
established lies largely with the employer (Hall et al., 2007)i.  
From a theoretical perspective, these shifts in voice practice can be located in inherent features of 
different types of voice arrangement which act to shape employer preferences (Bryson, 2004). 
Union representation involves an independent party in voice arrangements, and therefore 
requires management to cede a measure of its decision-making prerogative. Against this, by 
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acting as the agent of collective voice, unions can reduce the costs to the employer incurred by 
the exit of otherwise dissatisfied workers and, by involving employees, improve the quality of 
work-related decisions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Non-union forms of representation are 
conceptualised as a form of ‘union substitution’, which can secure the benefits of collective 
voice whilst not having to cede authority to an independent party (Purcell and Georgiadis, 2007). 
According to Bryson (2004), HRM theorists (e.g. Storey, 1992) contend that direct voice will be 
more effective voice in reducing exit and improving work-related decisions since representative 
arrangements create a barrier between managers and employees, and fail to reflect heterogeneity 
in worker interests. In practice these different forms of employee voice co-exist - direct voice 
mechanisms are found in the majority of unionised British workplaces, whilst indirect 
consultative mechanisms are more widespread where unions are present (Bryson, 2004) -- 
suggesting that employers may secure complementarities from a dual or multi track approach.  
Multinationals and employee voice 
Bringing multinational employers into the picture adds a further dimension to consideration of 
employer choice. A core issue in debates over their impact on employment practice in host 
environments has been the extent to which MNCs seek to innovate, through inwards diffusion of 
home country practices, or to adapt to prevailing practice locally. Because of their embeddedness 
in national institutions, including frameworks of labour law, employee representation and 
indirect channels of consultative voice have been regarded as matters more constrained to local 
adaptation than direct channels of employee involvement, seen as more open to innovation 
(Ferner, 1997). In the context of contemporary Britain, however, the growing heterogeneity of 
representative arrangements, minority coverage of both union representation and indirect 
consultative arrangements and permissive framing of the ICE legislation, suggest that these more 
institutionally embedded features might also now be open to innovation by MNCs.  
Concerning the nature of such innovation, preferences are seen to be shaped by the institutions 
governing the practice of employee representation and consultative voice in MNCs’ domestic 
environments (Almond et al., 2005): institutions which form part of an inter-locking set which 
variously define the specific characteristics of different ‘national business systems’ (Whitley, 
1999). Almond et al (2005: 277) stress, however, that these preferences ‘may [have to] be 
modified to fit the institutional context of various host countries’. In addition, preferences may 
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differ amongst MNCs from a given country of origin, reflecting the important of distinctive 
variants within national business systems, and associated different approaches to employee 
representation and consultative voice, giving rise to ‘intra-model’ variation (Almond and Ferner, 
2006).  
In addition, there is a potential asymmetry between MNCs headquartered in countries such as the 
US, with a tradition of anti-unionism, and those based in the countries of continental western 
Europe, which provide institutional and legal support to collective employee representation and 
consultation, in choice of voice practice in an institutionally permissive host environment such as 
the UK. Whereas the former may well be inclined to replicate domestic US practice, the latter 
may see an opportunity to escape constraints which domestic environments are perceived to 
impose (Meardi et al., 2009) and experiment with different, Anglo-American practice (Ferner 
and Varul, 2000).  
Existing research on the voice practice of MNCs has largely focused on the foreign operations of 
multinationals headquartered in a handful of countries: the US above all, Japan, Germany and the 
UK. Less is known about the approaches of MNCs based in other parts of Europe: indeed 
survey-based studies have tended to treat Europe as a homogeneous block (XXXX, 2007). 
Investigation has also tended to focus on employee representation, less so on consultative voice. 
In particular, ‘although there is increased recognition that multiple [voice] channels may be the 
norm’ (Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005: 29), and the relationship between direct and indirect 
forms of consultative voice has been addressed in several recent studies (Brewster et al., 2007; 
Bryson, 2004; Millward et al., 2000), the relative balance between the two forms has not been 
examined through the prism of the practice of MNCs based in different countries. Wood and 
Fenton-O’Creevy (2005) examine the balance amongst MNCs based in a single country across a 
range of host environments. 
US-based MNCs have ‘long been associated with hostility to unions in their foreign operations’ 
(Ferner et al, 2005: 703), reflecting the anti-unionism of major variants – union avoidance ‘low 
road’ and union substitution ‘HRM’ - of the American business model (Almond and Ferner, 
2006). Under the American system there is little scope for non-union forms of representation 
(LeRoy, 2006), which has translated into ‘a marked preference for non-collective employee 
representation’ (Colling et al., 2006: 96) including direct forms of employee involvement. 
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Empirically, the imprint of the American model on the practice of US-owned MNCs is 
confirmed by the comparatively high incidence of non-unionism amongst their operations in 
Britain reported in a number of previous surveys (reviewed by Ferner et al., 2005). Yet, amongst 
the operations of US-based MNCs in Britain, Colling et al. (2006) detect a measure of 
pragmatism: union recognition being accepted in many of the manufacturing operations they 
studied. They draw attention to ‘intra-model’ variation according to sectoral norms and age of 
subsidiary. Such variation is consistent with the idea of heterogeneity amongst firms rooted in 
different variants of the American business system (Almond and Ferner, 2006; Katz and 
Darbishire, 2000).  
Japanese-owned MNCs are generally held to have a preference for a (single) enterprise union or 
(non-union) company council, reflecting the company union model that prevails in Japan. 
Consistent too with long-established practices of direct employee involvement in Japanese 
production, the use of mechanisms such as team briefings and quality circles is expected to be 
prominent in the foreign operations of Japanese MNCs (Guest and Hoque, 1996; Wilkinson et 
al., 1993). Wilkinson et al’s survey of operations of Japanese-owned manufacturing MNCs in 
Wales found union recognition at almost all, which took the form of a single union agreement in 
the great majority. Almost all had also established non-union based consultative forums. Other 
studies of Japanese MNCs in Britain confirm that they pursue a dual track approach to 
consultative voice, being more likely than either US-based MNCs or local firms to have 
representative-based forms of voice and to make use of team briefings and quality circles (Guest 
and Hoque, 1996; Wood, 1996). In contrast, and pointing to intra-model variation, the Japanese-
owned manufacturing plants in Elger and Smith’s (2005) in-depth study were predominantly 
non-union and use of direct forms of employee involvement limited.  
The German model is characterised by dual channel employee representation, with unions 
representing workers in multi-employer collective bargaining and works councils, with extensive 
powers of consultation and codetermination, representing worker interests within the firm. The 
diversified quality production which became the hallmark of the German industrial model 
(Streeck, 1992), rested on extensive employee involvement; more recently expressed in the 
combination of direct consultation practices with the established tradition of indirect consultation 
(Tüselmann et al., 2005).  In a major survey of the UK operations of German-based MNCs, 
compared against a reference group of American-owned counterparts, Tüselmann et al (2005) 
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identify the translation of this modified German model into the British context: union recognition 
is combined with widespread take-up of direct consultation practices. German-based MNCs are 
more likely to recognise trade unions than their US-based counterparts but display an equivalent 
incidence of direct consultative practices. Ferner and Varul (2000) draw attention to the 
existence of intra-model variation, in the form of non-unionism amongst some UK operations of 
German-owned MNCs, locating it in the devolution of responsibility for IR policy to subsidiary 
managers and associated scope for experimentation with currently dominant, Anglo-American 
business.     
Sweden’s single channel system is characterised by high levels of union representation, which 
ensure the basis for trade union-based consultative voice within firms. Delegated forms of work 
organisation, resting on group-based forms of employee participation, constitute a further 
distinctive feature. The continued salience of these features is confirmed by recent survey 
evidence (Brewster et al., 2007; Gill and Krieger, 2000). Data on the voice practices of Swedish 
multinationals overseas is limited, although a study of employee involvement practices in three 
smaller-sized MNCs found that direct forms of voice tended to be transferred to the UK 
operations but not indirect forms (Andersen, 2006). The opportunity to escape perceived 
constraints on voice arrangements at home and/or to experiment with Anglo-American practice 
may also be attractive to some Swedish MNCs.   
In France, legislative support is given to a plurality of representative forms within firms, both 
union- and workforce-based. Consultative structures are mandatory in firms employing at least 
50 (Tchobanian, 1995). In practice, union representation is a minority phenomenon amongst 
firms, reflecting low levels of union membership, although other forms of employee 
representation are widespread. Consultative structures are found in four out of every five firms. 
Direct forms of employee consultative voice, however, are less widespread than in many other 
European countries (Gill and Krieger, 2000; Tchobanian, 1995). There is little available evidence 
on voice practices in the overseas operations of French-owned MNCs, although French 
multinationals have been prominent in extending the practice of social dialogue through 
consultative structures to European- and global-levels (Contrepois et al., 2007). A study  of the 
central eastern European operations of prominent French MNCs reports, however, that 
representation and indirect consultation tend only to be found where companies have acquired 
brownfield sites with pre-existing arrangements (Contrepois et al., 2007).   
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Britain’s single-channel system of employee representation has rested on voluntary recognition 
of trade unions by employers. Recent trends and developments in employee representation and 
consultative voice are outlined above. In the early 1990s, UK-based MNCs were found to be 
somewhat more likely to recognise trade unions in their UK operations than their overseas-
owned counterparts, with the reverse being the case for direct forms of employee voice 
(Marginson et al, 1993). There was no difference in the incidence of indirect consultative voice. 
Investigating representation and voice arrangements in the European operations (including 
Britain) of 25 UK-based MNCs a decade later, Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy (2005) found that 
two-thirds had union and/or non-union representation arrangements. Direct forms of consultative 
voice were utilised in three-quarters, including 32% which relied on these solely. Although the 
two surveys are not directly comparable, the findings of the second suggest that consultative 
voice practice amongst UK-based MNCs has shifted since the first was undertaken.  
This review of extant findings provides the basis for two main propositions, to be empirically 
examined. The first relates to the presence and form of employee representative structures whilst 
the second concerns the relative emphasis management accords to direct or indirect forms of 
consultative voice. The sub-propositions relating to MNCs based in continental western Europe 
need to be framed more tentatively than those for American-, Japanese- and UK-based 
multinationals: first, since the former may see the UK’s institutional environment as offering the 
possibility to escape the constraints of, rather than inwardly transfer, domestic voice practice; 
and second because of the relative lack of previous evidence.  
Proposition A: Patterns of employee representation will differ between the operations of 
MNCs based in different countries, reflecting differences in their domestic systems. In 
particular:  
1) US-owned MNCs will be comparatively less likely to have representative 
arrangements, either union or non-union;  
2) Japanese-owned MNCs will be comparatively more likely to have 
representative arrangements, either union or non- union;  
3) German-owned MNCs may be comparatively more likely to have union-based 
representative arrangements;  
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4) Swedish-owned MNCs may also be comparatively more likely to have union-
based representative arrangements; 
5) French-owned MNCs may be comparatively more likely to have 
representative arrangements, either union or non-union 
6) UK-owned MNCs will be comparatively more likely to have representative 
arrangements, either union or non-union.  
Proposition B: The relative emphasis placed on direct or indirect forms of consultative 
voice will differ between the operations of MNCs based in different countries, reflecting 
differences in their domestic systems. In particular:  
1) US-owned MNCs will emphasise direct forms;  
2) Japanese-owned MNCs will place equal emphasis on both forms;  
3) German-owned MNCs may either emphasise indirect forms or place 
equivalent emphasis on both 
4) Swedish-owned MNCs may place equivalent emphasis on both forms;  
5) French MNCs may emphasise indirect forms;  
6) UK-owned MNCs will emphasise direct forms.  
A counterfactual in the case of either proposition is that intra-model variation may dampen 
country-of-origin influences. The foregoing review suggests that factors such as sector, age of 
subsidiary and company strategy are also likely to influence patterns of employee representation 
and the relative emphasis between direct and indirect channels of consultation. Consideration of 
intra-model variation leads to two further propositions:  
Proposition C: Differences in patterns of employee representation according to the 
country of origin of MNCs will be attenuated by other factors, such as sector, age of 
subsidiary and company strategy.  
Proposition D: Differences in the relative emphasis on direct or indirect forms of 
consultation according to the country of origin of MNCs will be attenuated by other 
factors, such as sector, age of subsidiary and company strategy.  
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 3. Data  
The data come from a large-scale, 2006 survey of employment practice in the operations of 302 
MNCs in the UK involving a structured interview with a senior HR executive. The achieved 
sample exceeds that of most surveys of employment practice amongst multinationals (XXXX, 
2007), and allows comparison of MNCs from different countries of origin, including intra-
European variation, within the same host environment. MNCs with at least 500 employees 
worldwide were covered: for overseas-owned companies, the survey required them to also have 
at least 100 employees in their UK operation; for UK-owned multinationals the equivalent was 
an operation employing at least 100 in another country.   
The survey was based on a listing of the population compiled by the authors, the most 
comprehensive available, and involved two stages. XXXX (2007) provide details of the design 
and methods. First, a short screening questionnaire was administered by telephone to companies 
provisionally identified as multinationals in the population listing. Of the 1419 companies where 
calls were successfully completed, one in three did not meet the size criteria. Non-response 
complicates calculation of the response rate: for the first stage it was an estimated 54 per cent 
(XXXX, 2007)ii. Second, a face-to-face structured interview with a senior HR manager in the 
UK operationsiii was undertaken, addressing a range of human resource and industrial relations 
practice. Interviews were sought from the 903 MNCs confirmed as conforming to the survey’s 
size criteria, and were successfully completed in 302 multinationals representing just over one-
thirdiv. Attaining this total was assisted by a letter of endorsement, indicating the relevance of the 
study’s aims to HR practitioners, from the UK’s main professional organisation – the Chartered 
Institute for Personnel and Development (CIPD). Representativeness checks between the two 
stages of the survey revealed similar profiles according to country-of-origin and employment 
size, but indicated slight under-representation of service sector MNCs in the main survey as 
compared to the screener. To correct for this, the main survey findings have been weighted to 
reflect the sector profile of the screener samplev.   
The fieldwork at both stages was undertaken by a professional survey agency, contracted by the 
researchers, i.e. the authors, in a manner similar to that employed in realising Britain’s WERS 
series (see Kersley et al., 2005: 328-34). Access was secured and interviews arranged by the 
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agency, using a letter from the researchers outlining the aims of the study and requesting 
cooperation together with the CIPD endorsement. The face-to-face interviews were conducted by 
some twenty of the agency’s professionally-trained interviewers. In addition to their training, 
consistency of approach across interviews - and interviewers - was ensured by the use of CAPI 
technology, the preparation of detailed guidelines on administering the survey instrument, 
interviewer briefings – involving the researchers – prior to fieldwork, and consistency checks on 
the resulting dataset. CAPI streamlines the administration of the complex, structured 
questionnaire, cross-checks responses for consistency during the course of interviews and 
records and stores data instantly. Throughout the process there was liaison between the 
researchers and the agency.  
Employee voice arrangements were one of four areas of employment practice addressed in the 
survey. Questioning focused on practice for the largest occupational group (LOG) amongst non-
managerial employees in the UK operation. Concerning employee representation, respondents 
were initially asked ‘Thinking of the LOG in the [name of the MNC’s UK operation], are trade 
unions recognised for the purposes of collective representation?’. Those respondents answering 
that unions were recognised at some, but not all sites, were then asked about non-union sites: 
‘Is/are there any non-union based structure(s) of collective employee representation for the 
LOG?’. An identical question was asked of the respondents answering that there was no union 
recognition at any site. Section 4 gives descriptive statistics summarising responses.   
Consistent with recent studies of employee voice (Bryson, 2004; Willman et al., 2006), the 
presence of direct consultative voice was taken as being indicated by the use of at least one of 
four two-way mechanisms for employee communication and involvement. A first question asked 
‘Which of the following mechanisms do you regularly use to communicate with the LOG within 
[the name of the MNC’s UK operation]?’ and specified eight options, of which six were one-way 
and two two-way mechanisms: i) ‘meetings of senior managers and the whole workforce’; ii) 
‘meetings between line managers and employees (sometimes called briefing groups)’vi. A second 
question asked about employee involvement on the job: ‘Could you tell me whether you use … 
iii) groups where employees discuss issues of quality, production or service delivery such as 
problem-solving or continuous improvement groups’; iv) ‘formally designated teams in which 
employees have responsibility for organising their work and carrying out a set of tasks’.  
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Turning to indirect consultative voice, respondents were asked about arrangements at UK 
company and site levels. Respondents were first asked ‘Are regular meetings held between 
management and representatives of employees at this level of [name of the MNC’s UK 
operation] for the purposes of information provision and consultation?’, and then asked: ‘Are 
regular meetings held between management and employee representatives of employees at lower 
levels of [name of the MNC’s UK operation] which are primarily concerned with information 
provision and consultation?’. Joint consultative committees and company councils were 
mentioned as examples, ‘regular’ was defined as ‘more than once a year’ and ‘lower levels’ was 
clarified as meaning site level or several, but not all, sites.  
Respondents reporting the use of two-way direct mechanisms and representative-based, 
consultative meetings at either or both levels were asked a further question about management 
policy towards the two channels of consultative voice: ‘Which of the following statements best 
describes management’s relative emphasis in [name of the MNC’s UK operation] on 
mechanisms for communicating and consulting with employees?’. Three statements were 
specified: i) ‘emphasis on direct communication and consultation’; ii) ‘emphasis on indirect 
communication and consultation (e.g. through joint consultative committee or company 
council)’; or iii) ‘equivalent emphasis on direct and indirect communication and consultation’. 
Descriptive findings from this sequence of questions are presented in section 4. 
The country of origin of each MNC was identified, defined as the country where the operational 
headquarters of the worldwide company was locatedvii. The cell sizes required to undertake 
viable analysis necessitated the grouping of some countries of origin into three larger 
geographical clusters. Specifically, companies were categorised into eight groups: the US, 
France, Germany, Japan and the UK, the Nordic countries, the rest of Europe and the rest of the 
world. Concerning the Nordic cluster, the number of Swedish-based MNCs was too small for 
viable analysis. Given broad similarity in key aspects of voice arrangements in the four Nordic 
countries - high levels of union presence within companies, and trade-union based indirect 
consultative voice - the nine Swedish-owned MNCs were grouped with five Danish-, five 
Finnish- and three Norwegian-owned companies. The rest of Europe and rest of the world 
clusters are more residual in nature, although there are grounds for differentiating two groups. A 
defining feature of industrial relations in nearly all European countries when viewed in global 
perspective, and one that influences the practice of European-based MNCs, is the presence of 
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arrangements for representative-based consultative voice within companies (Marginson and 
Sisson, 2004). Elsewhere in the world, and especially in the non-European Anglophone countries 
which accounted for 15 of the 18 cases concerned, there is no such tradition.  
Section 2’s consideration of the potential influence of country of origin on employee 
representation and consultative voice arrangements drew attention to the intra-model variation 
uncovered by some studies. The survey did not address heterogeneity of management style 
associated with the main variants of a given national business model; at best this can be 
indirectly inferred from differences in other variables such as sector and date of establishment 
(vintage). Nonetheless it contains data on a range of demographic variables, including sector and 
vintage, and measures of corporate strategy which are likely to influence voice arrangements and 
thereby constitute sources of intra-model variation. The anticipated influence, if any, of each of 
these factors on the two dimensions of voice addressed is briefly considered.  
Sector. Differences can be expected across the three broad industrial sectors identified: 
manufacturing, other production and services. In particular, union organisation is longer 
established and more widespread in manufacturing than services (Dølvik, 2001), a distinction 
which also amongst US-owned MNCs reflects the enduring influence of different variants of the 
American business model (Ferner et al, 2005). In turn, manufacturing MNCs are also likely to 
place greater emphasis on indirect forms of consultative voice, than their service sector 
counterparts.   
Employment Size. The survey asked about the number employed in the UK operations. 
Representative structures, either union or non-union based, might be more common in larger 
than smaller sized UK operations (Marginson et al., 1993); larger UK operations might also be 
more likely to emphasise indirect forms of consultative voice.  
Vintage. If the political and economic context now prevailing in the UK is less constraining than 
hitherto, MNCs which have established operations in the UK more recently may enjoy more 
scope to establish non-union based representative arrangements than longer established firms. 
Longer established firms might engage in ‘double breasting’ (Beaumont and Harris, 1992) - 
entailing a mix of union and non-union arrangements at, respectively, older and newer sites. 
Method of growth. MNCs growing by acquisition are more likely to have mixed patterns of 
employee representation, involving union and non-union based structures inherited at different 
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sites, than those which have grown organically (either by opening new sites or expanding 
existing ones).  
Diversification. A mixed pattern of employee representation might also be more common in 
MNCs whose UK operations comprise unrelated businesses, as compared to those operating in a 
single business.  
The precise specification of these potential sources of intra-model variation, and the country-of-
origin variables, is given in Appendix Table A1, which also reports the mean values relevant to 
the subsequent regression analysis.  
 
4. Findings  
The section commences with descriptive information on the measures of employee 
representation and consultative voice, and recent changes in the patterns observed. In so doing, 
the dependent variables for the subsequent logistic regression analysis, which tests the 
propositions developed above, are specified.  
a) patterns of employee representation  
Unions are represented for the purposes of collective representation of the LOG at one or more 
sites in 47% of MNCs. The total includes 16% where recognition is across all sites, 23% at some 
or most sites and 8% at a MNC’s single UK site. Non-union representative arrangements for the 
LOG exist in 45% of those MNCs not recognising unions at any site, accounting for 24% of all 
cases. In four out of every five cases, these arrangements cover all sites or a company’s single 
UK site. In addition, almost one-half of the companies with union recognition at some or most 
sites have non-union representative arrangements at sites where there is no recognition, 
accounting for 11% of all cases. Altogether 34% of multinationals have non-union representative 
arrangements. Overall, there are representative arrangements, union and/or non-union, in 71% of 
MNCs. The presence of any representation constitutes the first dependent variable in the logistic 
regression analysis reported below. Summarising the overall pattern, Table 1 distinguishes 
between four types of arrangement: this four-way variable constitutes the second dependent 
variable in the regression analysis.   
Table 1: Patterns of employee representation  
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Representation arrangement %  
Union only (all, most/some, single site(s)) 37 
Non-union only (all, most/some, single site(s)) 24 
Hybrid (union at some sites, non-union at others) 11 
Neither union nor non-union 29 
Base: All companies (N=302)  
Findings on recent changes in representation arrangements reveal a discernible trend away from 
union recognition and towards non-union representative arrangements.  The trend away from 
union recognition is mainly apparent amongst ‘unionised’ companies which have opened new 
sites; there was little change in recognition status following acquisition of sites from other 
companies amongst the 205 MNCs where acquisition(s) had occurred in the previous 3 years. Of 
60 MNCs which both recognise unions at existing sites and had opened one or more new sites in 
the previous 3 years, just 18% had recognised unions at all these new sites whilst 42% had not 
recognised unions at any; the remaining 40% had recognised unions at some. Turning to non-
union representative arrangements, half (51%) of the MNCs with these reported that they had 
been established within the previous 3 years. This suggests significant recent innovation in 
representative arrangements, probably prompted by introduction of the UK’s Information and 
Consultation of Employees legislation (see below).  
b) indirect and direct consultative voice  
The incidence of the four direct forms of consultative voice specified above is shown in the top 
panel of Table 2. Briefing groups are used almost universally (96% of cases), whilst the other 
three forms are each found in three-quarters of companies. One or more of these two-way forms 
were found in all but four companies (1%).  
Table 2: Direct and indirect forms of consultative voice  
Consultative mechanism % 
Meetings of senior management and whole workforce 76 
(Team) briefing groups  96 
Problem-solving or continuous improvement groups  77 
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Formally designated teams with delegated responsibility 73 
Any direct consultative voice 99 
Representative consultation arrangement at UK level  73 
Representative consultation arrangement below UK level (i.e. 
site; groups of sites) 
77 
Any representative consultation arrangement 82 
Base: All companies (N=302)  
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows almost three-quarters of MNCs (73%) reported regular 
meetings between management and employee representatives at the level of the UK operation for 
the purposes of information and consultation. In addition, there are representative-based 
consultative structures below the level of the UK operation, covering either individual or groups 
of sites, in 77% of multi-site companies. Taken together, 82% of MNCs have arrangements for 
indirect consultative voice within their UK operationsviii. 
The UK’s ICE legislation does not automatically require firms to take steps to comply (Hall et 
al., 2007). Instead it requires companies to respond to a request from employees to establish 
arrangements, should one be forthcoming, or enables management to initiate the process, should 
it so wish. Unlike the more general picture of relative inactivity across UK companies falling 
within the legislation’s scope (Hall et al., 2007; Kersley et al., 2005), the legislation would seem 
to have prompted substantial recent change in MNCs’ arrangements for employee consultation. 
Forty-two per cent of companies with consultative arrangements reported that they had made 
changes over the previous 3 years: in nine out of every ten cases, such change involved the 
establishment of new arrangements at all (three-quarters of the relevant total) or some (one-
quarter) sites; in seven out of ten it (also) involved modification of existing arrangements. Of the 
54 MNCs introducing non-union representative arrangements over the previous 3 years (see 
above), over three-quarters also report establishing new consultative arrangements. This picture 
suggests that MNCs are at the forefront of legislatively induced innovation.   
Respondents in 243 MNCs (81%) reported  both indirect and direct forms of consultative voice; 
55 companies (18%) had direct forms, but no indirect arrangements; 3 companies had indirect 
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arrangements but did not use any of the direct mechanisms; and one company used neither. The 
243 companies using both were asked about the respective emphasis management placed on the 
indirect and direct channels. Their responses, which form the third dependent variable for the 
regression analysis below, are reported in Table 3.  
Table 3: Relative emphasis on indirect and direct channels of consultative voice  
Relative emphasis %  
Emphasis on indirect channels 16 
Equivalent emphasis on direct and indirect 42 
Emphasis on direct channels  41 
[Don’t know] [1] 
Base: Companies with both channels of consultative voice (N=243)  
Although, consistent with wider developments (Purcell and Georgiadis, 2007), an emphasis on 
direct channels dominates one on indirect channels, of note also – and supporting earlier 
argument - is that a ‘dual track’ policy of equivalent emphasis on both kinds of channel is as 
widespread.  
c) employee representation: regression analysis 
The regression analysis proceeds in two steps. First, country-of-origin influences on the two-way 
contrast between MNCs reporting any representative arrangement (union and/or non-union) and 
those reporting none are investigated in a binary logistic regression. Second, influences on the 
four alternatives in Table 1 are explored. Since there is no clear ordering amongst the four 
alternatives, the appropriate estimation technique for the second step is multinomial regression. 
In both steps ‘neither union nor non-union’ representation is taken as the reference category.  
The estimates resulting from the ‘any representation’ regressions are reported in Table 4, first, 
including the country-of-origin variable only and, second, the variables which are potential 
sources of intra-model variation also.  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE  
The first set of estimates is significant at the 1% level overall. The Beta coefficients indicate 
some significant country-of-origin influences on the presence of any representative arrangement 
as compared with the US-owned reference group. The odds ratios give the relative magnitude of 
 17
these effects. For example, the odds of French- and German-owned MNCs having arrangements 
for employee representation are, respectively, more than three and almost seven times that of 
their American counterparts. MNCs based in the Nordic countries, the UK, the rest of Europe, 
Japan and the rest of the world are, however, not significantly more likely to have representative 
arrangements than US-based MNCs.  
The second set of estimates is also significant at the 1% level overall. Moreover, the step chi-
square indicates that the inclusion of the other factors significantly adds to overall explanatory 
power. The Nagelkerke R2 rises from 0.08 to 0.27. French- and German-owned multinationals 
continue to be significantly more likely than US-owned companies to have representative 
arrangements, and so now do those based in the UK. The coefficients on the other country-of-
origin variables continue to be insignificant. A strong sector contrast is evident, with both service 
and other sector multinationals being significantly less likely than those in manufacturing to have 
representative arrangements. The odds ratios indicate the magnitude of these sector effects as 
approximately one-sixth in the case of services compared to manufacturing, and around one-
quarter for other production. None of the other structural variables exercises a significant 
influence on ‘any representation’. 
Results of estimates from the multinomial regression of the four alternative forms of 
representation arrangement, first, including the country-of-origin variable only and, second, the 
other variables also are reported in Table 5.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE  
The first set of estimates only achieves significance at the 10% level overall. The Beta 
coefficients indicate that some countries/regions of origin are significantly associated with 
particular patterns of employee representation, as compared with the reference category of US-
owned MNCs. The odds ratios indicate that the odds of French and German-owned MNCs 
having union only representative structures are, respectively, more than three times and almost 
ten times greater than US-owned companies. French-owned companies are also significantly 
more likely than US-based multinationals to have non-union only representative structures. The 
other significant country-of-origin influence concerns UK-owned MNCs, which are significantly 
more likely than US-based companies to have hybrid representative arrangements. 
Representative structures in MNCs based in the Nordic countries, the rest of Europe, Japan and 
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the rest of the world are, however, not significantly different from those found in US-based 
MNCs.  
Turning to the second panel of Table 5, which includes the other factors, the estimates are 
significant at the 1% level overall. The step chi-squared statistic indicates that the inclusion of 
the other factors significantly improves overall explanatory power. The Nagelkerke R2 increases 
from 0.11 to 0.35. The same country-of-origin effects remain significant; in addition, UK-based 
MNCs are now also significantly more likely to have union-only representative structures than 
US-owned companies. Of the other factors, two significantly influence representation 
arrangements. First, striking sectoral differences are apparent. Service-sector multinationals are 
significantly less likely than manufacturing ones to have any of the three patterns of 
representative arrangement as compared to no form of representation at all. MNCs in other 
production are also less likely to have union and non-union representation arrangements than 
those in manufacturing. Second, multinationals which have engaged in acquisition are 
significantly more likely to have hybrid representative arrangements. The influence of UK 
employment size, vintage and diversification on arrangements for employee representation is not 
significant.  
Overall, support for proposition A is mixed: whilst some country-of-origin influences operate in 
the way anticipated, others do not. Two of the three sub-propositions framed with more 
confidence find support, but so too do two of the three which were more tentatively framed. 
Specifically: 1) relating to US-owned MNCs is supported in comparison with multinationals 
based in Germany, France and the UK; 2) concerning Japanese-owned MNCs, is however not 
supported; 3) relating to German-owned companies, although tentatively framed, is supported; 
likewise 5) relating to French-owned companies; whereas on 4) the findings on Nordic-based 
MNCs do not provide support. German- and French-owned MNCs appear more likely, in the 
UK, to reflect practice in their domestic systems than do multinationals based in the Nordic 
countries. Sub-proposition 6) concerning UK-owned MNCs is supported, and the magnitude of 
the relevant coefficient in Table 4 is smaller than those for French- and German-, but not Nordic-
owned MNCs. The superiority of the regressions including the demographic and corporate 
strategy variables - in terms of model chi-squared statistics, step chi-squared statistics, 
Nagelkerke R2 and the significant influence exercised by sector and method of growth on 
patterns of employee representation - indicates stronger support for proposition C, which takes 
 19
account of intra-model variation. Importantly, the relevant country-of-origin effects retain their 
significance with the inclusion of the other variables; the demographic and corporate strategy 
factors complement, and do not displace, the effects of country-of-origin.   
The presence of intra-model variation was investigated further for the US-based multinationals 
within the sample. A logistic regression for any representation against sector, size, age of 
subsidiary and aspects of company strategy, reported in Appendix Table 2, is significant at the 
1% level. The Nagelkerke R2 is 0.42. A striking sectoral difference is again apparent: American 
service sector multinationals are significantly less likely than their manufacturing counterparts to 
have any form of representative arrangement. Other factors, however, do not appear to be a 
significant source of intra-model variation. A multinomial logistic regression for form of 
representation, not reported here, yielded similar findings: union, non-union and hybrid patterns 
of representation are each significantly more likely amongst American multinationals in 
manufacturing than those in services.  
d) consultative voice policy: regression analysis  
The alternatives for management policy towards consultative voice (Table 3) are ordered; hence 
the estimation technique adopted was ordinal logistic regression, taking ‘emphasis on indirect 
channels’ as the reference categoryix. Results of estimates including, first, country-of-origin only 
and, second, also the other factors are reported in Table 6. A positive sign on a coefficient 
indicates that an emphasis on indirect consultation is more likely than equivalent emphasis on 
both, which in turn is more likely than an emphasis on direct consultation. A negative sign 
indicates the opposite.   
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE  
The estimates including country-of-origin only (first and second columns) only achieve 
significance at the 10% level overall. Japanese-based MNCs are significantly more likely than 
their US counterparts to emphasise indirect forms of consultation, as are those based in the rest 
of Europe. The odds, for example, of Japanese-owned companies emphasising the indirect 
consultation channel over an equivalent emphasis on both, or placing equivalent emphasis on 
both over emphasising the direct channel, are some four times greater than for US-owned 
multinationals. As anticipated, UK-owned do not differ significantly from US-owned MNCs. 
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The French, German and Nordic-ownership variables do not, however, exercise a significant 
influence.  
The inclusion of the other factors (columns 3 and 4) results in a more robust set of estimates: the 
chi-squared is significant at the 1% level overall and so too is the step chi-squared statistic for 
the inclusion of the other factors. The Nagelkerke R2 is 0.19, as compared to 0.06 previously. 
The significance of the country-of-origin variables is unchanged. There are significant sector 
differences, with multinationals in services and other production showing a marked tendency to 
emphasise direct over indirect channels as compared with those in manufacturing. Contrary to 
expectations, MNCs which have established operations in the UK over the past 5 years are 
significantly less likely to emphasise the direct channel than longer established companies. 
Given that these companies were also noticeably more likely to report being involved in a 
merger or acquisition over the previous 5 years than longer established MNCsx, it is tempting to 
infer that current policy might reflect a legacy effect from previous ownership. Yet MNCs which 
have grown by acquisition show a marked, and significant, tendency to emphasise direct over 
indirect channels. On diversification, companies diversified into related businesses are 
significantly less likely to emphasise direct channels than those focused on a single business, 
although those diversified into unrelated businesses do not differ significantly from the latter. 
UK employment size does not have a significant influence.  
Overall, support for proposition B is qualified: the specific sub-propositions framed with more 
confidence find support, whereas those framed more tentatively do not. Accordingly, 1) relating 
to US-owned MNCs is confirmed in comparison with MNCs based in Japan and the UK; 2) 
concerning Japanese-owned MNCs is supported; and 6) receives support, as UK-owned are no 
less likely to emphasise direct channels than US-owned companies. Sub-propositions 3) 
concerning German-owned MNCs; 4) relating to Swedish-owned MNCs; and 5) concerning 
French-owned MNCs are not supported, suggesting that MNCs from these countries do not, in 
the UK, feel constrained to place the emphasis on the indirect channel that is associated with 
their domestic systems. The superiority of the regression including the other factors - in terms of 
model chi-squared statistic, step chi-squared statistic, Nagelkerke R2 and the influence exercised 
by four of the five demographic and company strategy variables – lends support to proposition 
D, which takes account of intra-model variation. The relevant country-of-origin effects retain 
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their significance with the inclusion of the other variables, supporting the idea that the latter do 
not displace, but complement, the former.  
Again, the presence of intra-model variation was investigated further for US-based 
multinationals. A logistic regression against sector, size, age of subsidiary and aspects of 
company strategy, reported in Appendix Table 3, is significant at the 5% level. The Nagelkerke 
R2 is 0.22. A sharp sector difference was evident: US MNCs in services are significantly more 
likely than their manufacturing counterparts to emphasise direct forms of employee 
involvement. Other factors did not appear as a significant source of intra-model variation.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
This investigation of the influence of MNCs’ country-of-origin on their employee voice practices 
in a permissive host environment reveals an uneven picture. Influence is more apparent on 
employee representation than on management policy towards consultative voice channels, and 
varies in significance across companies headquartered in major industrialised countries. The 
influence of demographic factors and corporate strategy structure, in particular sector and 
method of corporate growth, indicates the presence of intra-model variation amongst MNCs 
based in any given country. Such intra-model variation complements, and does not seemingly 
override, home country influences, consistent with Katz and Darbishire’s (2000) ‘converging 
divergencies’ thesis.  
Findings from several previous studies on MNC voice practices are confirmed, whilst some 
others are confounded. The former include the well-established preference of US-based MNCs 
for non-unionism, and direct forms of employee consultation (Colling et al, 2006; Ferner et al, 
2005). Tüselmann et al’s (2005) conclusion that German-based MNCs tend to recognise trade 
unions in the UK context is supported, but less so their contention that German companies are 
embracing a new model in which as similar weight is given to direct forms of employee 
consultation as indirect ones. Contrary to some studies (Guest and Hoque, 1996; Wilkinson et al, 
1993), but consistent with Elger and Smith (2005), Japanese-owned multinationals are no more 
likely than their US counterparts to have employee representative structures, although they tend 
to emphasise the indirect consultative voice channel where such structures are present. UK-
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owned MNCs are distinctive in the incidence of hybrid arrangements, consistent with a trajectory 
away from union-based arrangements (Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2005).  
The validity of differentiating according to country-of-origin amongst continental European-
based MNCs, an innovative aspect of the study’s design, is underlined by the varying magnitude 
and significance of the respective country-of-origin influences. Consistent with domestic 
practice, and differing from the union-based arrangements characteristic of German-based 
multinationals, French-owned MNCs are distinctive in terms of the presence of some form of 
representative arrangement, either union or non-union. Nordic MNCs are, however, no more 
likely to have representative structures than their US counterparts. And MNCs based in these 
continental European countries are, contrary to their domestic practice, no more likely to 
emphasise the indirect channel of consultative voice than their US counterparts. In a relatively 
permissive institutional environment such as the UK, such a finding is consistent with the 
possibility that these multinationals may be embracing voice regimes associated with dominant 
Anglo-American business practice (Ferner and Varul, 2000) and/or to escape constraints on 
employee voice practice which domestic environments are perceived to impose (Meardi et al., 
2009).  
The attention drawn to the presence and, by implication, salience of intra-model variation in 
some recent studies (e.g. Colling et al, 2006; Ferner and Varul, 2000) is underscored by the 
findings. A limitation is that the influence of heterogeneity within national business systems, 
stemming from different management styles – such as the contrast between ‘New Deal’, union 
avoidance and union substitution models amongst US-based firms (Almond and Ferner, 2006) - 
can at best be indirectly inferred from the impact of demographic variables such as sector and 
vintage. Broad industrial sector exercises a clear-cut and consistent influence on patterns of 
representation and channels of voice. The contrast between manufacturing and services in terms 
of union representation and incidence of indirect forms of consultation is well established 
(Dølvik, 2001). In addition, non-union representative arrangements and less managerial 
emphasis on direct channels of consultative voice also differentiate manufacturing from service 
MNCs. Vintage did not, however, exercise a consistent influence, possibly due to the inability of 
the study’s measure to differentiate between modes of entry into the UK. Concerning corporate 
strategy, method of growth exercises a clear-cut influence: MNCs which have engaged in recent 
acquisition stand out in their voice practices from those which have not. The finding is consistent 
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with the limited available evidence (Rees and Edwards, 2009). The wider implication for the 
influential ‘national business system’ literature (e.g. Whitley, 1999) is that attention needs to be 
paid to the varieties within national models associated with sector differences and with those in 
management style and strategy.  
The extent of recent changes in voice arrangements and the findings on management policy 
towards different voice channels speak to the relevance of examining employer preferences 
(Willman et al., 2006; Purcell and Georgiadis, 2007). The presence of some country-of-origin 
influences confirms the UK as an environment which is permissive of variation in industrial 
relations practice. Moreover, the presumption in the literature that, because of considerations of 
labour law and union organisational strength, MNCs are likely to adapt to local conventions in 
their employee representation (and indirect consultation) practices (see Ferner, 1997) is 
confounded. The findings reveal substantial recent innovation amongst MNCs, albeit in part 
legislatively induced. Prompted by the 2005 implementation of the UK’s ICE legislation, 
representative arrangements which are non-union based have spread and there has been 
significant activity in establishing new indirect consultative structures where these did not 
previously exist. On both counts the picture differs from that emerging from the 2004 WERS 
(Kersley et al, 2005). Although the timing of the two surveys might account for some of the 
differencexi, the scale of the recent changes revealed here suggests that MNCs are a leading force 
in the changing contours of representation and voice practice in Britain. This ‘multinational 
effect’, as well as whether companies headquartered in some countries are more likely to act as 
innovators than those based in others, calls for further analysis. 
The study also carries implications for wider debates on the changing nature of employee voice 
arrangements in the main Anglophone countries. The trend towards declining union 
representation is confirmed by the lower incidence of union recognition at new sites. But the 
preferred alternative of multinational employers is not necessarily no representation at all: MNCs 
operating in Britain are, as noted above, prominent in their embrace of non-union representative 
structures. Insofar as this reflects the effect of newly-imposed legislative constraint, in the guise 
of the ICE Regulations, this development may also extend to Ireland, but not to the Anglophone 
countries of north America and Australasia.  In respect of consultative voice, the pertinence of 
Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy’s (2005) observation that multiple channels are becoming the norm 
is underscored. Both direct and indirect channels were present in the great majority of MNCs. 
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Moreover, management policy in these multinationals is as likely to emphasise a dual track 
approach, giving equal emphasis to either, as it is to emphasise the direct channel. Employer 
preferences are not necessarily absolute, preferring one channel or another; combining different 
channels can offer complementary voice benefits to employers. As a result, significant numbers 
of multinational employers in a major Anglophone economy still embrace representative-based 
forms of employee voice.  
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Table 4: Any representative arrangement regression results 
Independent Variables Odds Ratios Beta Coeffs 
(SEs) 
Odds Ratios Beta Coeffs 
(SEs) 
Intercept  - 0.718***(0.195) - 1.545***(0.500) 
Origin – US     
Origin – France 3.413 1.227*(0.647) 4.338 1.467**(0.716) 
Origin – Germany 6.825 1.921*(1.053) 9.027 2.200**(1.098) 
Origin - Nordic  2.072 0.728 (0.589) 1.682 0.520 (0.651) 
Origin – UK 1.733 0.550 (0.425) 2.788 1.025**(0.493) 
Origin – Rest of Europe  1.073 0.070 (0.428) 1.276 0.244 (0.478) 
Origin - Japan  2.072 0.728 (0.589) 1.987 0.687 (0.650) 
Origin – Rest of World   -0.488 -0.718 (0.510) 0.465 -0.765 (0.593) 
Sector - Manufacturing     
Sector - Other Prodn - - 0.284 -1.259**(0.615) 
Sector – Services - - 0.137 -1.988***(0.341) 
Vintage -10+ years     
Vintage - 0-4 years - - 1.816 0.597 (0.540) 
Vintage - 5-9 years - - 1.190 0.174 (0.401) 
Growth – neither     
Growth – acquisition - - 1.178 0.163 (0.458) 
Growth – new sites - - 0.891 -0.116 (0.410) 
Growth – both - - 1.066 0.064 (0.449) 
Diversific’n – single      
Diversific’n - unrelated - - 0.521 -0.653 (0.711) 
Diversific’n – related - - 1.152 0.142 (0.411) 
UK emp size / 1000  - - 1.000 0.000 (0.040) 
     
N  291  291 
Model Chi-square  15.57**  60.65*** 
Step Chi-square  -  45.08*** 
Nagelkerke R2  0.08  0.27 
-2LLR  324.74  279.65 
N is reduced because of missing values on some variables.  
The reference categories are in italics.  
Levels of significance are denoted by starts: * = 10% level, ** = 5% level, *** = 1% level. 
Table 5: Pattern of representation regression results [country of origin only] 
Independent Variables Union Only Non-union only  Hybrid 
Odds Ratios Beta Coeffs 
(SEs) 
Odds Ratios  Beta Coeffs Odds Ratios Beta Coeffs (SEs) 
Constant   0.025 (0.225)  -0.262 (0.243)  -1.361*** (0.354) 
Origin – US       
Origin – France 3.250* 1.179* (0.696) 4.333** 1.466** (0.702) 1.300 0.262 (1.208) 
Origin – Germany 9.750** 2.277** (1.073) 3.900 1.361 (1.180) 3.900 1.361 (1.458) 
Origin - Nordic  2.194 0.786 (0.642) 1.625 0.486 (0.713) 2.925 1.073 (0.842) 
Origin – UK 1.517 0.417 (0.483) 1.156 0.145 (0.543) 4.333** 1.466** (0.580) 
Origin - Rest of Europe  1.463 0.380 (0.466) 0.650 -0.431 (0.599) 0.780 -0.248 (0.852) 
Origin - Japan  2.194 0.786 (0.642) 1.950 0.668 (0.690) 1.950 0.668 (0.936) 
Origin - Rest of World   0.542 -0.613 (0.601) 0.289 -1.242 (0.819) 0.867 -0.143 (0.858) 
 
N    291 
Model Chi-square  30.70* 
Nagelkerke R2   0.11 
-2LLR    105.60  
N is reduced because of missing values on some variables.  
The reference categories are in italics.  
Levels of significance are denoted by starts: * = 10% level, ** = 5% level, *** = 1% level.  
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Table 5 (cont): Pattern of representation regression results [country of origin plus other factors] 
Independent Variables Union Only Non-union only  Hybrid 
Odds Ratios Beta Coeffs (SEs) Odds Ratios  Beta Coeffs (SEs)  Odds Ratios Beta Coeffs (SEs) 
Constant  - 0.815 (0.551) -  0.774 (0.578) - -1.608 (0.942) 
Origin – US       
Origin – France  3.766*  1.326* (0.780) 6.277**  1.837** (0.782) 1.280 0.247 (1.315) 
Origin – Germany 13.207**  2.581** (1.126) 4.428  1.488 (1.213) 7.064 1.955 (1.560) 
Origin - Nordic  1.788  0.581 (0.714) 1.457  0.376 (0.764) 2.211  0.793 (0.921) 
Origin – UK 2.681*  0.986* (0.553) 2.101  0.742 (0.601) 5.905**  1.776** (0.705) 
Origin – Rest of Europe  1.761  0.566 (0.525) 0.718 -0.332 (0.628) 1.324  0.280 (0.927) 
Origin - Japan  2.062  0.724 (0.708) 1.633  0.490 (0.733) 3.366  1.214 (1.022) 
Origin – Rest of World   0.560 -0.580 (0.685) 0.276 -1.287 (0.868) 0.863 -0.148 (0.998) 
Sector - Manufacturing       
Sector - Other Prodn 0.290* -1.240* (0.691) 0.201* -1.605* (0.842) 0.363 -1.015 (0.850) 
Sector – Services 0.123*** -2.095*** (0.380) 0.202*** -1.598*** (0.403) 0.061*** -2.804*** (0.602) 
Vintage -10+ years       
Vintage - 0-4 years 2.343  0.851 (0.586) 1.349  0.300 (0.676) 1.489  0.398 (0.751) 
Vintage - 5-9 years 1.389  0.328 (0.439) 1.257  0.229 (0.469) 0.562 -0.576 (0.766) 
Growth - neither       
Growth – acquisition 1.090  0.086 (0.498) 0.900 -0.106 (0.566) 3.651*  1.295* (0.739) 
Growth – new sites 0.679 -0.386 (0.455) 1.279  0.246 (0.570) 0.562 -0.576 (0.932) 
Growth – both 0.721 -0.328 (0.506) 1.039  0.038 (0.561) 5.715** 1.743** (0.738) 
Diversific’n – single        
Diversific’n - unrelated 0.544 -0.609 (0.814) 0.355 -1.037 (0.980) 1.410  0.343 (1.111) 
Diversific’n – related 1.348  0.298 (0.459) 0.893 -0.113 (0.477) 2.022  0.704 (0.775) 
UK emp size / 1,000   1.008  0.008 (0.045) 0.900 -0.105 (0.082) 1.023 0.023 (0.047) 
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N    291 
Model Chi-square  112.60*** 
Step Chi-square  536.67*** 
Nagelkerke R2  0.35 
-2LLR    641.97 
N is reduced because of missing values on some variables.  
The reference categories are in italics.  
Levels of significance are denoted by starts: * = 10% level, ** = 5% level, *** = 1% level.  
 
Table 6: Emphasis on direct or indirect consultation regression results  
Independent Variables Odds Ratios Beta Coeffs 
(SEs) 
Odds Ratios Beta Coeffs 
(SEs) 
Intercept – emphasis on 
direct 
- -0.061 (0.197) - -0.271 (0.422) 
Intercept – equivalent 
emphasis on both  
- 1.983***(0.243) - 1.973***(0.445) 
Origin – US     
Origin – France 1.586 0.461 (0.463) 2.064  0.725 (0.514) 
Origin – Germany 2.219 0.797 (0.538) 2.082  0.733 (0.553) 
Origin - Nordic  1.531 0.426 (0.484) 1.519  0.418 (0.510) 
Origin – UK 1.168 0.155 (0.378) 1.948  0.667 (0.424) 
Origin – Rest of Europe  2.120* 0.751*(0.430) 2.176*  0.778*(0.452) 
Origin - Japan  4.103*** 1.412***(0.490) 3.463**  1.242**(0.501) 
Origin – Rest of World   2.615 0.961 (0.625) 1.990  0.688 (0.645) 
Sector - Manufacturing     
Sector - Other Prodn - - 0.381* -0.964*(0.554) 
Sector – Services - - 0.483** -0.729**(0.287) 
Vintage -10+ years     
Vintage - 0-4 years - - 2.148*  0.765*(0.449) 
Vintage - 5-9 years - - 1.143  0.134 (0.336) 
Growth - neither     
Growth – acquisition - - 0.384** -0.956**(0.382) 
Growth – new sites - - 0.864 -0.147 (0.348) 
Growth – both - - 0.350** -1.051**(0.413) 
Diversific’n – single      
Diversific’n - unrelated - - 0.684 -0.379 (0.712) 
Diversific’n – related - - 1.827*  0.602*(0.356) 
UK emp size / 1000  - - 0.987 -0.013 (0.024) 
     
N  235  235 
Model Chi-square  12.20*  41.64*** 
Step Chi-square  -  29.44*** 
Nagelkerke R2  0.06  0.19 
-2LLR  62.04  441.91 
N is reduced because of missing values on some variables.  
The reference categories are in italics.  
Levels of significance are denoted by starts: * = 10% level, ** = 5% level, *** = 1% level. 
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Table A1: Mean values of independent variables included in the regression analysis 
Variable name Description Mean value (A) Mean value (B) 
Origin  Country or region of origin   
US [reference]  0.41 0.41 
France  0.08 0.09 
Germany  0.05 0.06 
Nordic   0.07 0.08 
UK  0.14 0.15 
Rest of Europe   0.11 0.10 
Japan   0.07 0.08 
Rest of World    0.06 0.04 
Sector  Broad industrial sector   
Manufacturing [reference]  0.51 0.57 
Other Production  0.07 0.07 
Services  0.41 0.36 
Vintage Years established in UK   
0-4 years  0.13 0.12 
5-9 years  0.21 0.22 
10+ years [reference]  0.66 0.66 
Growth Method of recent growth   
Acquisition  0.20 0.21 
New sites  0.23 0.25 
Both  0.24 0.21 
Neither [reference]  0.33 0.34 
Diversification  Diversification into related 
or unrelated businesses  
  
Unrelated  0.06 0.05 
Related  0.78 0.78 
Single [reference] No – single business 0.17 0.17 
UK emps / 1000 UK employment / 1000 2.04 2.38 
N =  291 235 
The two sets of regressions relate to differing bases, to which the columns refer:  
- column A: pattern of employee representation (base: all companies)  
- column B: relative emphasis on direct or indirect channels of consultative voice (base: companies 
reporting both channels)  
N in each column is reduced because of missing values for some variables.  
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Table A2: Any representative arrangement in US MNCs regression results 
Independent Variables  Odds Ratios Beta Coeffs (SEs) 
Intercept  - 2.228**(0.876) 
Sector - Manufacturing   
Sector - Other Prodn 0.123 -2.094**(0.891) 
Sector – Services 0.046 -3.078***(0.584) 
Vintage -10+ years   
Vintage - 0-4 years 1.086 0.083 (0.965) 
Vintage - 5-9 years 2.615 0.961 (0.671) 
Growth - neither   
Growth – acquisition 1.633 0.491 (0.752) 
Growth – new sites 1.824 0.601 (0.694)  
Growth – both 1.040 0.039 (0.767) 
Diversific’n – single    
Diversific’n – unrelated or 
related 
0.536 -0.624 (0.760) 
UK emp size / 1000  1.269 0.238 (0.158) 
   
N  119 
Model Chi-square  43.78*** 
Nagelkerke R2  0.43 
-2LLR  106.77 
N is reduced because of missing values on some variables.  
The reference categories are in italics.  
Levels of significance are denoted by starts: * = 10% level, ** = 5% level, *** = 1% level.  
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Table A3: Relative emphasis on direct or indirect consultation in US MNCs regression results  
Independent Variables  Odds Ratios Beta Coeffs (SEs) 
Intercept – emphasis on direct  - -1.111 (0.696) 
Intercept – equivalent emphasis 
on both 
- 1.354*(0.717) 
Sector – Manufacturing   
Sector - Other Prodn 0.797 -0.227 (0.974) 
Sector – Services 0.254 -1.372***(0.482) 
Vintage -10+ years   
Vintage - 0-4 years 1.766 0.569 (0.814) 
Vintage - 5-9 years 1.030 0.030 (0.530) 
Growth - neither   
Growth – acquisition 0.615 -0.486 (0.592) 
Growth – new sites 1.036 0.035 (0.519) 
Growth – both 0.668 -0.403 (0.677) 
Diversific’n – single    
Diversific’n – unrelated or 
related 
0.821 -0.197 (0.609) 
UK emp size / 1000  0.848 -0.165 (0.140) 
   
N  97 
Model Chi-square  20.45** 
Nagelkerke R2  0.22 
-2LLR  161.47 
N is reduced because of missing values on some variables.  
The reference categories are in italics.  
Levels of significance are denoted by starts: * = 10% level, ** = 5% level, *** = 1% level. 
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i The ICE legislation expressly permits compliance via direct as well as indirect consultative voice channels.   
ii  This is on the assumption that non-respondents would have screened out of the population on the basis of the size 
criteria at the same rate as respondents.  
iii  Senior HR managers were defined as those with a job title of HR/Personnel Director, Senior Manager, Manager 
or Senior Officer or titles deemed as equivalent by the respondent.  
iv Average duration of interviews was 70 minutes.  
v  Representativeness checks of the screener sample against the original database listing of eligible companies have 
also been undertaken (XXXX, 2007).  
vi  There is no measure of meetings of senior managers with the whole workforce which allow for employee input in 
the survey, which Bryson (2004) and Willman et al (2006) include in their operational definition. The present survey 
asked about meetings of senior managers with the whole workforce, but without specifying that they should allow 
for employee input. However, all cases which reported these also reported team briefings.  
vii  The location of the operational headquarters of an MNC may differ from a ‘flag of convenience’ location 
registered for taxation purposes (XXXX, 2007).  
viii Of 230 multi-site cases, 140 have consultative arrangements at both levels, 22 at UK group level but not lower 
levels, 26 at lower levels but not UK group level, and  40 have consultative arrangements at neither level. Sixty of 
72 single site cases have consultative arrangements. 
ix  This ordering assumption was confirmed by the parallel lines test.  
x  Eighty-five per cent of MNCs establishing operations in the UK over the previous 5 years report being involved in 
a merger or acquisition over that period, as compared with 46% of MNCs with UK operations established for more 
than 5 years.  
xi  WERS2004 was undertaken in the year before implementation of the ICE regulations and the multinationals’ 
survey started almost a year after.  
